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The embodied approach to cognition consists in a range of theoretical proposals sharing 
the idea that our concepts are constitutively shaped by the physical and social constraints 
of our body and environment. Still far from a mutually enriching interplay, in recent years 
embodied and psychoanalytic approaches are converging on similar constructs as the 
ones of intersubjectivity, bodily self, and affective quality of verbal communication. Some 
efforts to cope with the sentient subject were already present in classical cognitivism: 
having expunged desires and conflicts from the cognitive harmony, bodily emotions 
re-emerged but only as a noisy dynamic friction. In contrast, the new, neural, embodied 
cognitive science with its focus on bodily effects/affects has enabled a dialogue between 
neuro-cognitive perspectives and clinic-psychological ones, through shared conceptual 
frameworks. I will address crucial issues that should be faced on this reconciling path. 
With reference to two kinds of contemporary addictions – internet addiction disorder 
and eating disorders – I will introduce a possible therapeutic approach that is built upon 
the core role of the acting-sentient bodily self in a dynamic-social and affective 
environment. In Psychoanalytic Psychodrama, the spontaneous re-enactment of a past 
(socially and physically constrained) experience is actualized by means of the other, the 
Auxiliary Ego. This allows homeostatic and social-emotional affects, i.e., drives and 
instincts, to be re-experienced by the agent, the Protagonist, in a safe scenario. The 
director-psychoanalyst smoothly traces back this simulation to the motivated, and 
constrained, early proximal embodied interactions with significant others, and to the 
related instinctual conflicting aims. The psychoanalytic reframing of classical psychodrama 
does not merely exploit its original cathartic function, rather stands out for exploring the 
interpersonal constitution of the self, through an actual “re-somatization” of psychoanalytic 
therapy. Unspoken/unspeakable feelings pop up on stage: the strength of this treatment 
mainly rests on re-establishing the priority of the embodied Self over the narrative Self. 
By pointing out the possible conflicts between these two selves, this method can 
broaden the embodied cognition perspective. The psychodramatic approach will 
be briefly discussed in light of connectionist models, to finally address linguistic and 
methodological pivotal issues.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, embodied cognition, psychoanalytic psychodrama, intersubjectivity, sentient bodily 
self, affects, internet addiction disorders, eating disorders
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this work is to prepare the ground for an enriching 
dialogue between cognitive science and psychoanalysis by 
identifying common theoretical constructs and potential new 
methods. In this view, the introduction is dedicated to clarify 
the specific nature of cognition assumed by the present article, 
that is, an “embodied” nature. It denies that representations 
are built out of amodal symbols and claims that sensory, motor, 
and affective processes are intrinsic to cognition.
The argument is articulated by first discussing recent 
neuroscience literature. From a “cognitive” to an “affective” 
neuroscientific perspective, scientists are nowadays converging 
on themes that traditionally belonged to psychoanalytical 
approaches as the ones of the bodily self, intersubjectivity, 
unconscious, and prosodic-affective quality of verbal 
communication. Along with the common questions, divergences 
are also addressed and traced back to two scarcely reconcilable 
objectives. In cognitive science view the objective is to generalize 
and to predict; in psychoanalysis the objective is to dig deep 
into the unique self and its conflicting states.
To clarify the convergences, in what follows four thematic 
cores are addressed (environment; drives, instincts, and 
unconscious conflicts; intersubjectivity; perception of the body) 
and are connected with two disorders: internet addiction disorder 
and eating disorders (EDs). This problematization will allow 
the introduction of the psychodramatic method and the contrast 
between an “acting” cure and a “talking” cure. Next, the 
psychoanalytic reframing of classical psychodrama is introduced: 
psychoanalytic psychodrama does not merely exploit the cathartic 
function but stands out for exploring the self in its interpersonal 
constitution, through an actual somatization of psychoanalytic 
models, prioritizing the embodied self over the narrative self. 
Its distinctive features are discussed against traditional 
psychoanalytical approaches and body-oriented therapies.
To further ease an effective interdisciplinary collaboration, 
a possible integration with ecological connectionists models 
(implementing the grounding in sensory, motor, and affective 
processes as intrinsic to cognition) is outlined. Finally, linguistic 
and methodological issues are addressed: shared constructs 
across disciplines are necessary to make effective and substantial 
advancements within this new science. To encompass the 
sentient bodily self, by empirically supporting this exploration 
also outside the therapeutic setting, the further challenge of 
neuropsyhcoanalysis requires the exploitation, and the 
integration, of the most promising methodologies. This effort 
would guarantee the necessary flexibility with respect to 
different settings-contexts, as well the opportunity to investigate 
different issues.
WHICH COGNITIVE SCIENCE?
Nowadays the adjective “cognitive” is abused, generating 
a lot of confusion about its meaning. The reason is that 
there is not a single cognitive science, but at least two. 
The first one is the classical cognitive science, “Cognitivism”: 
a computational science according to which the mind, 
similarly to the software of a computer, is a mechanism 
for manipulating arbitrary and amodal symbols. This science 
basically arose from the ashes of behaviorism. Consistently 
it had a twofold aim: rejecting behaviorism while maintaining 
scientificity and preserving the “science of mind” separated 
by neuroscience (Parisi, 2002).
Progress in neuroscientific research, as well as gradual 
awareness that computing machines lack human-like 
intelligence, created the demand for a new cognitive science. 
This science had to consider not only the brain, but also 
the body (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese and Lakoff, 
2005): this neural cognitive science can be  identified with 
“Embodied Cognition”. Embodied cognition has led to a 
conceptual revolution by demonstrating that concepts consist 
in the reactivation of the same neural activation pattern 
involved when we  perceive objects/entities they refer to and 
when we  interact with them (Scorolli and Borghi, 2007; 
Scorolli et  al., 2012; Borghi et  al., 2013; Scorolli, 2014). 
The plethora of recent theories, labels, and approaches 
traceable within this perspective may appear puzzling: a 
clear conceptual clarification is provided by Pezzulo et  al. 
(2013). While the label “grounded” refers to the physical 
foundation of cognition, affected for instance by the laws 
of physics, the label “embodied” specifically points to the 
physical constraints of our body, i.e., to the sensory-motor 
experiences shaping our cognition. Finally, the label “situated” 
nicely refers to the dependence of cognitive processing on 
both current constraints and tasks demands. These level-
specific modulations exert additive effects on cognition. They 
can be conceptualized as a cascade, ranging from the physical 
properties of the world to the sensorimotor, affective and 
interoceptive processes, and in the end to the specific 
characteristics of the environment, including its social and 
cultural features (Pezzulo et  al.,  2013).
Regardless of the taken perspective, these theoretical 
proposals share the idea that grounding phenomena are 
constitutive of cognition, thus are not just optional add-ons. 
In the present work, the label “embodied” is privileged to 
directly point to bodily, affective, and emotional states 
(Niedenthal et  al., 2005; Wilson-Mendenhall et  al., 2011), 
though without disregarding the role, functions, and 
requirements of the physical and social context.
EMBODIED COGNITION AND 
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Previous attempts towards a mutually enriching dialogue between 
neuroscience and psychoanalysis have been mainly focused on 
“the new neuropsychological theoretical and methodological 
apparatus of cognitive neuroscience (that) can be  easily and 
profitably incorporated into theoretical psychoanalysis without 
any cost” (Semenza, 2014, p.  3). This kind of approach assumes 
that emotions, feelings, affects, and drives can be  first neglected, 
as a background noise with respect to the investigation of action 
and perception, or memory and language processes; they can 
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be  re-integrated into the cognitive scaffolding at a later stage. 
The risk is not providing an account for “authenticity, individuality, 
feeling, and character” (Brown, 2014, p. 10). In contrast, embodied 
theories claim that mind is not just cognition, intelligence, language, 
skills, but also motivation, perceived sensations, and felt emotions 
(i.e., bodily effects). Despite this theoretical claim, only in recent 
years there has been a growing attention (also) for empirical 
data pertaining to the emotional and the motivational spheres 
(thus belatedly with respect to the breakthrough of affective 
neuroscience: Panksepp, 1998, 2005; Damasio, 2000; Damasio 
et  al., 2000). This interest has been fostered by several factors 
and new scientific challenges:
– The emergence of an embodied social cognition, and thus 
the interest not just in motor automatic resonance mechanisms, 
but also in complementary (non-imitative) actions involved 
for instance in joint activity (Rumiati and Bekkering, 2003; 
Sartori and Betti, 2015; see also the upcoming research issue 
by Brunel et  al., 2019).
– The notable advances in artificial life simulations, that have 
shifted the attention to populations of organisms that evolve 
biologically, to their specific needs for survival and 
reproduction, and hence to the motivations deriving from 
them (Parisi, 2013, 2014).
– The acknowledgment that psychological phenomena are 
complex, determined by a huge number of variables interacting 
with each other non-linearly (e.g., the emergence of mental 
disorders from the interactions of different symptoms), and 
thus the necessity to approach them from a complex systems 
perspective (e.g., Borsboom et  al., 2018).
– The novel evidence and theoretical accounts of the 
representation of abstract concepts, which emphasize the role 
of emotions and sociality in grounding abstractness (see the 
recent theme issue by Borghi et  al., 2018).
– The new frontier research on interoception, and its central 
role for cognition, that breaks out of corticocentricity. In the 
special issue on the impact of interoception beyond the 
homeostatic/allostatic reflexes (Tsakiris and Critchley, 2016), 
authors from different perspectives address how information 
about the internal states of the body are integrated with thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors. A compelling body of empirical evidence 
and neurobiological insights is discussed to explore also clinical 
implications and methodological issues.
– The final factor impacting current embodied perspectives 
definitely is the widespread availability of neuroimaging 
techniques for the investigation of those brain regions that 
are associated with cognitive-emotional interactions. Both 
indirect measurements (based on hemodynamic responses) and 
direct measurements (based on brain electrical dynamics) are 
making a difference in the examination of the interplay between 
emotional control and cognitive regulation (Tyng et  al., 2017).
Beyond these factors, in last years neuroscientists, philosophers, 
computer scientists, and roboticists have re-evaluated psychological 
schools that ruled in Europe in the first half of the twentieth 
century: Gestalt theory of perception, Piagetian and Vygotskian 
theories of cognitive development, and Freudian theory of 
psychosexual development. The theoretical frameworks of these 
scholars range from affective neuroscience to embodied cognition 
(e.g., Panksepp and Solms, 2012; Rizzolatti et  al., 2014): they 
share with the psychoanalytic approach the idea that the supremacy 
of “the cognitive” is made unsettled by “the dynamic”.
Regardless of the attempts of a worthwhile dialogue, 
cognitivism can hardly be integrated with psychodynamic 
theorization, which instead appears inherently related to new 
embodied approaches. With them, it shares at least the following 
views: (1) The rationality is seen as the tip of the iceberg; (2) 
the refusal of the primacy of the intellect over the emotions 
and the primacy of the mind over the body; (3) the “core 
self ” is conceived as the continuous interaction between intero- 
and exteroceptive stimuli (Northoff, 2012); (4) the individual 
mind is not simply “brainbound” but also distributed beyond 
the body’s edges (Hutchins, 1995) across non-bodily devices 
but also bodily social ones (Clark, 2003; Thompson and Stapleton, 
2009; Wilson, 2010) through interpersonal body representations 
(Costantini et  al., 2011); (5) a “genetic epistemology” approach, 
meaning that we  can better understand X if we  reconstruct 
how X has become what it is (Piaget, 1952; Parisi and Schlesinger, 
2002): accordingly, our mind cannot be conceived as just extended 
but, for the immature infant, also in need of boundaries for 
the overwhelming ambivalent stimuli (Freud, 1920; a skin to 
the mind: Levy and Lemma, 2004; a containing mind: Bion, 
1962); (6) many simultaneous causes produce many effects on 
the self, in largely unpredictable ways: to grasp the complex 
interplay of brain, body, and environment, a dynamical system 
approach is needed (Clark, 1999); (7) the acknowledgment of 
the limitations of science in predicting effects before they occur, 
and controlling all variables; and (8) the concerns about the 
scientific method: not the only way, and perhaps not even the 
best, for our knowledge of reality.
SHARED CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES 
BUT CENSORSHIPS
Unconscious, Empathy, and 
Intersubjectivity
As insightfully reviewed by Kihlstrom (2015), the term 
“unconscious” was used by Freud with three different meanings: 
to refer to thoughts, feelings, or desires that are not aware at 
any particular time; or available to consciousness in principle, 
even if they are not accessible at the present moment 
(“preconscious”); or not even available to consciousness. 
Nevertheless, in the dynamic sense of the term, only repressed 
mental contents were conceived as “unconscious”, like sexual 
and aggressive impulses prevented from being represented in 
consciousness (though still determinants of our thoughts and 
actions). The goal of the psychoanalytic treatment is to bring 
these contents into consciousness in order to be  dealt with.
We can easily guess that within the scientific-academic milieu 
this construct was not welcomed. While widely popular and 
evocative among clinicians and the public, the first blow was 
knocked by the behaviorist revolution. Concerned about raising 
psychology to the level of science, behaviorism has drastically 
cut off the unobservable mental life. The following breakthrough 
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of cognitivism led to progressive evidence on implicit perception, 
like in subliminal priming effects (e.g., Pesciarelli et  al., 2019), 
or on the distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive 
processes, like in the Stroop effect (e.g., Scorolli et  al., 2015). 
This new evidence in some way legitimized the construct of 
unconscious to refer to “unconscious cognition” (Kihlstrom, 
1987), thus in a descriptive-systematic sense, not in its dynamic 
foundational meaning. If we  define cognition as pertaining to 
any mental activity, unconscious cognition could not disregard 
feelings and desires (Kihlstrom, 2013). Nevertheless, the unsolved 
issue was still related to how, in the absence of conscious 
awareness, emotions and motivations can affect our thoughts 
and actions. The “explicit”/“implicit” distinction is more difficult 
to be  dealt with when encompassing the emotional sphere. 
Some behavioral and/or physiological components of implicit 
emotions can be objectively measured (though it is challenging 
to link them to the corresponding “source of stimulation”). 
Some other components can be caught only through “projective” 
measurements, dream imagery, and free associations (considering 
that the same cause can produce different effects, and not all 
these effects are synchronous). Kihlstrom (2015) foresees a 
future for the dynamic unconscious in the current renewed 
interest in consciousness, though recognizing that “carefully 
controlled experiments (…) have not yielded much evidence 
favoring the view of the dynamic unconscious as conceived 
in psychoanalytic theory, with its unconscious conflicts over 
primitive sexual and aggressive motives” (p.  996). To achieve 
a substantial breakthrough, it is probably necessary to change 
the perspective, introducing new concepts as well.
The concept of empathy, neglected by classical cognitive 
science, has been retrieved by the new neural embodied science. 
“A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy” 
(Freud, 1921, p.  110): such a farsighted statement has been 
neuro-physiologically accounted for by embodied cognition. 
The discovery of mirror neurons, and embodied simulation, 
has laid the foundation for the neuroscientific study of 
intersubjectivity and empathy as means of inter-individual 
transfer of meaning, opening the way to connect Freudian 
theory of the psyche with the most advanced scientific theories 
and discoveries (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2006; Gallese, 2007a).
With regard to the internal world, recently embodied approaches 
have emphasized the importance of emotions (Caruana and Gallese, 
2011, 2012), bodily self (e.g.,  Ferri  et  al.,  2012), and indirectly 
of the unconscious as well. Damasio (1999) refers to “nuclear 
consciousness”, whose foundation does have an emotional nature, 
thus it does not imply language. This implicit memory of the 
perceptions of self-with-others, which follow over time during 
the first year of life, is tacit, non-declarative, procedural, and, 
similarly to the Freudian unconscious, does have a crucial role 
in adult social life and relationships. The related “unconscious 
emotions” seem to be controlled by a subcortical circuit (amygdala, 
superior colliculus, and pulvinar). The so characterized unconscious 
does not correspond to Freudian “topical” unconscious (the id 
in the second topical), and there is no reference to Freudian 
repression; nevertheless the role of what is not accessible to 
consciousness is acknowledged and emphasized in the psychoanalytic 
relationship (for a recent reconsideration of the anatomical 
localization of consciousness with cross-references to Freudian 
view, see Solms 2017b, 2019). The patient and the psychoanalyst 
can unconsciously grasp, in a continuous and reciprocal motion, 
subtle stimuli of the other, that activate shared neural patterns 
(Gallese et  al., 2006; Ginot, 2015).
Verbal Communication and Its  
Prosodic-Affective Quality
Unlike psychoanalytic approaches, cognitivist ones seem to suggest 
first to ignore the affective noise, desires, and conflicts (at 
intrapersonal and interpersonal/intergroup level) and later to 
attach them to the impoverished reconstructed mind. Conversely, 
Freudian and embodied views share striking similarities, for 
instance, when accounting for speech (Freud, 1915b; Gallese, 
2007b, 2008). As masterly reviewed by Gallese (2009), within 
the analytic relation the affective quality of verbal communication 
assumes a critical role in terms of prosody (Rizzuto, 2008), 
rhythm, tone, timbre, and musicality, as well as syntax and tempi 
of speech (Mancia, 2006; Rizzuto, 2008; Gallese, 2011).
Recent evidence on language acquisition has shown that 
the ability of 4-day-old infants to distinguish utterances in 
their native languages from those of another language depends 
on prosodic cues (Mehler et  al., 1998). Gervain and Werker 
(2013) have shown that in 7-month-old bilinguals (succeeding 
in mastering their mother tongues as efficiently as monolinguals), 
the precocious and effortless acquisition of grammar is actually 
accounted by their skill on exploiting characteristic prosodic 
cues (pitch and duration). Furthermore, when investigating the 
development of language-specific trochaic bias in German-French 
bilinguals (i.e., languages with and without a trochaic lexical 
stress), Bijeljac-Babic et al. (2016) found that listening preferences 
of these 6-month-old infants were comparable to those of 
German-learning monolinguals but differed from those of same 
age French-learning monolinguals (i.e., no preference: Höhle 
et  al., 2009). This precocious emergence of a trochaic bias 
even in simultaneous bilinguals further supports the importance 
of prosodic information. Finally, it seems that precocious language 
learning processes (9-month-old infants) are specifically enhanced 
by social interaction, while not requiring long-term listening 
(Kuhl et  al., 2003). Overall, this evidence unveils the intimate 
link among embodied language, prosody, and intersubjectivity: 
the human language learning system flexibly adapts to and 
exploits the linguistic, affective-social environment (for a recent 
work on emotional word processing also in the domain of 
social cognition, see Herbert et  al., 2018).
Towards a Unique Total Self
A further contact point between embodied cognition and 
psychoanalysis can be found in their objectives. While cognitivism 
was aimed at discovering a supposed “normative averageness,” 
the new neural science is pointing out the significance of 
idiosyncratic profiles of cortical activation (Gallese, 2007a), as 
well as the individual characteristics in light of life experiences 
and unconscious facets (“Unique Total Self ”: Schaefer and 
Northoff, 2017). Similarly, psychoanalytic approaches underline 
the uniqueness of the patient and the role of the environment 
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in which she grew up (family), which may have fitted or not 
her basic personality tendencies, as introversion and extroversion 
(Rapaggi, 1994; John and Srivastava, 1999).
Limits
The limits, or rather “censorships,” of the new embodied science 
consist in not having adequately considered that perception is 
always accompanied by feelings of pleasure or pain, lust or 
grief (Panksepp, 1998; Cuccio et  al., 2013; Alcaro et  al., 2017; 
Solms, 2017a; Moccia et al., 2018): behavior cannot be explained 
apart from this Aristotelian interweaving (Lo Piparo, 2003). 
Actually, an analogous tendency to quit digging into bodily 
drives, repudiating the centrality of sexuality, characterizes also 
current developments of psychoanalytic approaches (for a critical 
discussion, see Green, 1995; Fonagy, 2008; Fotopoulou and 
Tsakiris, 2017). In spite of numerous studies on psychosomatic 
medicine (e.g. Lisi et  al., 2014), only a few empirical studies 
have tried to approach the appetitive dimension of sexuality, 
that is, the libido. Embodied evidence has made much progress 
on the investigation of how we  understand the emotions of 
others, but: how do we  understand ours? Where do they 
come from?
Sexual drives (specifically defined by source, aim, and object; 
Freud, 1915a) and the possible fixation of the libido (Freud, 
1905) are basically cut out from contemporary neuroscience, even 
if they laid the foundation, as well as the absolute novelty, of 
Freudian theorization. The general censorship is at least puzzling. 
There are a few enlightening exceptions, for instance from a 
neuropsychoanalytic perspective (e.g., Solms, 2012;  
Stoléru, 2014) or in a strictly embodied-grounded view (Papies 
and Barsalou, 2015; for an ethological approach to the study of 
the early modulation of sexual preferences, see Enquist et al., 
2011). These works raise new challenging questions on desires 
that do not directly result from physiological deprivation.
While psychic conflicts may or may not be  conscious, drives 
are not conscious per se: they arise from the interaction between 
biological and environmental stimuli and are dialectically 
constructed from both pressures (Dunn, 1993). But 
psychoanalytical theory has actually provided an account for 
the conscious phenomenology of sexual desire. Considering 
the oral stage of psychosexual development (0–18/24  months), 
the mouth is conceived as the primary erogenous zone; 
remarkably the mouth is also central in babies’ exploration. 
The time window ranging from 0 to 24  months corresponds 
to the Piagetian sensorimotor period (Piaget, 1945, 1952); 
coherently Piaget emphasized the mouthing behavior (mostly 
in the second stage of the first period, from 1 to 4  months). 
Recently, changes in mouthing of objects have been empirically 
identified exactly in this period: children ≤24  months exhibit 
the highest frequency of mouthing behavior, while children 
>24  months exhibit the lowest frequency (Tulve et  al., 2002; 
for an observational study on children up to 3 years old, see 
Juberg et al., 2001). Mouthing has been accounted for as crucial 
to proactively expose the gastrointestinal tract to environmental 
antigens (Fessler and Abrams, 2004). But this is not the whole 
story. Early mouthing is related to the objects it is applied 
to: the rigidity of an object affects the frequency and pattern 
of mouthing (and grasping) behavior, suggesting that this activity 
is not merely under the control of reflexive mechanisms (Rochat, 
1987). The interplay between the normal cognitive development, 
certifying a growing interest in the world, and the normal 
affective development, rooted on bodily drives and instincts, 
is deserving to be systematically addressed, beyond the borders 
of sectorial scientific disciplines.
NEEDS, DESIRES, AND ADDICTIONS
Cyber Presence and Eating Disorders
In recent years, new addictions are spreading: they are generically 
labeled as internet addiction disorder (IAD). They are in some 
way peculiar as not related to substance abuse, even if they 
could be  still explained by evolutionary models, by referring 
to the emotional systems of reward seeking and separation 
distress (Panksepp et  al., 2002). There is a debate on whether 
the last version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) should have classified these disorders as 
“mental disorders”. Currently, they are variously assessed: 
dependency on virtual relationships, cognitive overload, virtual 
sex addiction, and online gaming. Young (1998) identified three 
main stages in IAD progress: involvement, characterized by 
initial curiosity; substitution, when the activities that previously 
were central do not matter anymore; escape, when more frequent 
and longer time periods are spent using a PC or a smartphone. 
To date, the most reliable and updated assessment instrument 
is the Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS, Kwon et  al., 2013). 
Diagnoses associated with IAD are anxiety, mood disorders, 
and impulse control disorders. IAD occurs more frequently in 
individuals with low self-esteem, social difficulties, notable 
interpersonal sensitivity, obsessive thinking modalities, 
compulsive behaviors and/or personalities tending to social 
withdrawal (Cash et  al., 2012; for a theoretical framework on 
molecular underpinnings of IAD, see Montag et  al., 2016).
IAD can be  particularly disturbing in adolescents and it is 
basically related to social aspects: it can be  better labeled as 
“cyber-presence.” Studying 1,500 adolescents, between 14 and 
24  years old, the Royal Society for Public Health (2017) has 
identified the following symptoms: anxiety and depressive states, 
lack of sleep, obsession related to how appearing, cyberbullying, 
and a new phenomenon, the “fear of missing out”. The central 
issues shared by embodied and psychodynamic approaches suggest 
four possible thematic cores:
– Environment: IAD is a post-modernity disease (Valleur and 
Matysiak, 2004) characterized by a multiform group of disorders 
in which the object is a lawful and socially accepted-encouraged 
activity. Both the constant connection and the continuous social 
pressure towards certain models push to conform to an ideal 
that is not only aesthetic but also emotional: the specific 
environment can affect the spread of IAD.
– Drives, instincts, and unconscious conflicts: immediate 
gratification is allowed by the continuous accessibility of the 
network; in the long term this gratification is often accompanied 
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by subsequent negative effects (Marlatt et  al., 1988; Lee et  al., 
2008; for the assessment see Hoerger et al., 2011). It is interesting 
that elements of orality (analogously with the oral stage fixation 
present in some EDs) can be  identified in IAD: they result from 
the ability of the eyes to ingest the images more easily than 
the mouth can do with food (Rapaggi, personal communication).
– Intersubjectivity: the strongest component of the “selfie” 
(i.e., a photograph that one takes of herself, typically taken with 
a smartphone and shared via social media) is its inner contradiction. 
What might seem a clear act of narcissism hides strong insecurity 
and deep anxiety of reassurance, which apparently can only 
be satisfied by others’ approval, the “likes”. Nevertheless, far from 
calming the neurosis, publishing a selfie only amplifies it 
(Diefenbach and Christoforakos, 2017). These adolescents are 
characterized by a loss of interest for actual friendship and/or 
affective offline sharing; thus, the social network is no longer 
an instrument, but it appears as the final gratification goal.
– Perception of the body: the social network allows a high 
(illusory) level of control over one’s body image (e.g., on 
Instagram, the body becomes the one photographed and shared), 
as well as over emotions and relational contexts to be  shown 
to “online others”. The selection and photoshopping of the 
bodily image allow to obtain a broad consensus: the success 
is quantifiable in the number of “likes”.
The environment and the (not) felt body, as well as bodily 
control (the repression of drives and unconscious conflicts), do 
have a crucial role also in EDs. These disorders, although well 
known, in recent years have reached a transversal distribution: 
they no longer involve only young women. In anorexia nervosa 
(AN), the control over the (weight of) own body is realized 
through stoic restrictions in the quantity (and often the variety) 
of ingested food. Success is measured through the balance needle 
and the visual comparison with the mirror. As IAD, AN is 
also characterized by interpersonal social difficulties (Cardi et al., 
2018), body misperception (Linardon et al., 2018), and problematic 
sexual functioning (Castellini et  al., 2012). Hypothesizing that 
AN is associated with reduced perceived pleasantness during 
social interactions, Crucianelli et  al. (2016) examined the 
perception of interpersonal affective touch: tactile optimal touch 
(3 cm/s) elicited significantly lower pleasantness in patients than 
in healthy controls. Remarkably, cultural and social factors, that 
is, the environment, can affect the variability of EDs symptoms 
and their diffusion (e.g., orthorexia, a new disorder more common 
among the male than female population). As to possible relations 
between IAD and EDs, in a recent work Rodgers et  al. (2013) 
found that for both males and females the avoidance of body 
image is associated with social network addiction: for females, 
IAD and avoidance of body image are predictors of EDs.
WHY ADOPT PSYCHOANALYTIC 
PSYCHODRAMA?
The Body I Show, The Body I Feed
In both IAD and EDs, the body is not lived-felt, but rather it 
is conceived as an instrument: a shape to be photoshopped (IAD) 
or to be weighted (EDs), in any case a thing to be “fixed” before 
delivering it to the (virtual) others (IAD), or to the mirror (EDs). 
In this painful game, there is no space for the actual others 
and the actual relationships. While behavioral-cognitivist therapies 
cope with these disorders by focusing on the symptom, the 
psychoanalytic treatment traces back to the symptom’s affective 
matrix. Consistently with embodied approaches, it does not 
conceive the body in an objectifying dimension, but as “the 
body that I  am”, thus rejecting the Cartesian dualism mind-body 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Husserl, 1952). The body is seen in its 
entirety: not only as a perceptual and motor system, but also 
as a set of needs and desires (often to be unmasked). Thus, the 
body is present in every stage of the psychoanalytic path: for 
example, during the diagnosis the body is interrogated to trace 
the root of the symptom and/or its symbolic meaning. Triggering 
and perpetuating factors of EDs are often related to the relationship 
with one’s own body and sexuality: an objectified body in which 
the subject does not recognize herself, thus a body that she 
avoids. It is no coincidence that EDs, such as IAD, though 
transversal, have great incidence in adolescence, when the body 
quickly changes and the internal pressures-drives are as pressing 
as they are unknown. Synchronic and diachronic aspects of the 
self are crucial to understand these disorders’ symptoms in light 
of the attachment functioning, from infancy to adolescence 
(Amianto et  al., 2016). Actually many other “contemporary 
obsessions” revolve around the body and the (fictitious) need 
for its control. Consistently, in last years professional roles promising 
to teach how to exercise the best control over the body are 
exponentially spreading (e.g., beauticians, personal trainers, and 
nutritionists). Of course, the bodily self, encompassing instinctual, 
social and affective components, cannot be  grasped by 
these approaches.
Language in the Talking versus 
the Acting Cure
For psychoanalysis language is fundamental: the talking cure 
is enabled by intentional and affective attunement established 
within the analytic setting through the flow of words (Gallese 
et  al., 2007; see also Cimatti, 2016). This affective attunement 
closely resembles how mother and baby perceive each other’s 
emotional state (Emde, 1988a,b; for an overview on 
psychoanalytic infant research, see Beebe, 2018).
Embodied evidence has shown how language understanding 
activates motor simulations, but recent theoretical proposals 
have also highlighted how words are not only the “recording” 
of our past experiences, but they can be  conceived also as 
instruments that allow us to perform actions in the external 
world (Borghi et  al., 2013; Scorolli et  al., 2016; Borghi et  al., 
2017). Moreover, through internalized language we can speak 
to ourselves, supporting our thought processes (Borghi et  al., 
2017). If words are (social) tools, within a clinical setting it 
is legitimate to expect possible conflicts between the self 
instantiated by language, in its symbolic, reflective, and narrative 
aspects, and the bodily self, emerging from interpersonal relations 
(Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). Words seem to originate from 
communicative gestures (Corballis, 2002; Arbib, 2005), but 
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during the development (i.e., in the course of a progressive 
abstraction-symbolization process), they can go far away from 
authentic-spontaneous actions, becoming the most perfect 
tool of rationalization and intellectualization (i.e., defense 
mechanisms). Thus a tool that allows combining symbols/events 
in a logical way but that fails when dealing with unconscious 
conflicts, the “noisy frictions.” Frictions that the logic and the 
hic et nunc boundaries cannot grasp.
The Original Method and Its Analytic 
Reframing
For these reasons, an action method seems more suitable 
to shed new light on the unique total self. Psychodrama, 
conceived and developed by Moreno (1937, 1946, 1951; see 
also Apter, 2003), employs guided dramatic action to examine 
various issues raised by the individual (the Protagonist). 
The techniques used are intrinsically social and affective; 
the key ones are: doubling, role reversal, mirroring, soliloquy, 
and symbolized role playing (for details, see the section on 
Specificities of Psychoanalytic Psychodrama). Through the 
action on stage, psychodrama enables past, present, and 
future life events to be explored. Problems and their possible 
solutions are enacted rather than just talked about.
Psychodrama, unlike classical psychoanalytic therapy, gives 
space to the body in action, together with the acting bodies 
of the others. The Auxiliary Egos are participants from the 
audience taking part to the play in order to enact the specific 
scene. Psychodrama’s powerfulness has to be  found in the 
spontaneous emergence of possible (unconscious) conflicts 
between verbal and bodily messages. The glaring example is 
the one of a patient playing on stage and saying to the chosen 
auxiliary ego “I love you” while stepping back, thus expressing 
proximity by words, but acting a distance through the body. 
When the word is “detached” from the body, psychodrama 
allows the patient to feel this distance, which cannot be effectively 
grasped in the talking cure. This distance can be  brought to 
consciousness and even measured on stage. The “talking phase” 
comes after the drama, i.e., offstage: in this final phase, conscious 
logical thinking is gradually re-integrated. This phase, the 
interpretation proper, characterizes Psychoanalytic Psychodrama 
with respect to its classical counterpart. Psychoanalytic 
psychodrama had different definitions across years (see Lemoine 
and Lemoine, 1972; Jeammet and Kestemberg, 1987). The form 
to which I am referring to is the therapeutic approach suitable 
for dealing with the core role of the acting-sentient bodily 
self in a dynamic-social and affective environment. It is 
characterized by the spontaneous re-enactment of a socially 
and physically constrained experience actualized by means of 
auxiliary egos, in a fixed, intimate and trusted group.
Psychodramatic action can portray events already happened, 
but also reconstructed dreams, fantasies, or future events (planned 
or just imagined). The play unveils as a real event, allowing 
homeostatic and emotional-social affects (i.e., drives and instincts: 
id’s signature; Solms, 2017a) to be re-experienced by the protagonist 
in a safe scenario. The core role of the director-psychoanalyst 
consists in smoothly tracing back the current simulation to the 
motivated, and constrained, early proximities and interactions. 
Early interpersonal relations with significant others account for 
current ones: such early experiences shaped “the constitution 
of the minimal self, including the progressive sophistication of 
mental distinctions between ‘subject-object,’ ‘self-other’ and even 
‘pleasure-pain’” (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017, p.  7).
Differently from classical psychodrama, this knowledge 
method does not have a merely cathartic function. Even if 
using similar action techniques, it stands out for three main 
reasons: (a) acted loops (repetition compulsion) are traced 
back to the source (i.e., the relationships with significant others) 
directly on stage; (b) instead of listening to words at the expense 
of the body (i.e., reflective and narrative self), psychoanalytic 
psychodrama encourages embodied interactions in a given 
environment, as well as social and affective touch (i.e., proximal 
intersubjectivity and shared interoception: Fotopoulou and 
Tsakiris, 2017; von Mohr et  al., 2017); (c) at the end of the 
acted drama, the psychoanalyst (linguistically) delivers the 
interpretation suggested by the previous action, through retrieving 
embedded words. Thus, words “follow” the body, rather than 
constraining its intimate-relational-affective dimension: “the 
mind is there to serve the body’s needs in a given environment” 
Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017, p.  9). Importantly, the 
psychoanalyst never provides “instructions,” neither answers: 
the point is not replacing the old-wrong behavior with a 
new-right one, but bringing to consciousness the affective, and 
adaptive, meaning of the current behavior.
To instantiate the converging issues of embodied and 
psychodynamic approaches, four thematic cores have been 
addressed with respect to novel and widespread disorders (IAD), 
in parallel with already well-known disorders which are taking 
different context-specific facets (EDs). For the sake of 
completeness, it is worth noting that several other suffering 
conditions can benefit from psychoanalytic psychodrama 
treatment, for example, mood disorders, depression, anxiety, 
psychosomatic disorders (Dayton, 2006), as well as post-traumatic 
stress disorders, and grief issues, associated with addiction or 
related to traumas triggered by many causes (ranging from 
divorce to death of a loved one, Dayton, 2005).
Embodied Simulation: Traditional 
Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic 
Psychodrama
As outlined in the sections dealing with unconscious and verbal 
communication, traditional psychoanalytic approaches already 
foresee convergences with “embodied” constructs. Below I further 
address the connections between psychodynamic and embodied 
cognition referring to the mechanism of embodied simulation, 
to finally highlight the intrinsic relation of psychoanalytic 
psychodrama with embodied theories. The neurophysiological 
foundation for simulation theories was provided by the discovery 
of the mirror neurons (di Pellegrino et  al., 1992). In order to 
be  visually triggered, these neurons require an interaction 
between the agent of the action and the object of it (Gallese 
et  al., 2006), thus forming a system for matching observation 
and execution of motor actions. The homology between macaque 
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monkey F5 neurons and human Broca’s region suggested that 
the development of the lateral verbal communication system 
in humans derives from a more ancient communication system 
based on recognition of hand and face gestures (Rizzolatti et al., 
1996; see also Gallese et  al., 2004). Consistently mirroring 
phenomena have also been shown in relation to semantic aspects 
of language: the same motor areas are recruited when a person 
is understanding action sentences or actually performing the 
action (e.g., Buccino et  al., 2005; Borghi and Scorolli, 2009; 
Scorolli et  al., 2009). Importantly, evidence of parallel neural 
responses in speaker and listener talking does have crucial 
implications for psychoanalysis, since it unfolds through verbal 
communication, which conceivably constitutes the basis for 
unconscious communication (Gallese, 2009).
A substantial impact on the scrutiny of the neural underpinnings 
of social behavior comes from findings showing the critical 
role of internally generated somatosensory representations in 
recognizing the other’s emotional state conveyed by facial expression 
(Adolphs et  al., 2000; Adolphs, 2003). Mirroring mechanisms 
and emotional resonance have been variously underlined across 
different psychoanalytic concepts: projective identification (Klein, 
1946), emotional attunement (Stern, 1985),  empathic 
understanding (Kohut, 2010), mirror role of the mother (Winnicott, 
1971), and containing “digesting” mind (Bion, 1962). Nonetheless 
in classical psychoanalysis the interpersonal emotional exchange 
between patient and therapist basically occurs through verbal 
communication, thus in principle it cannot exploit visually 
conveyed messages. The psychoanalyst resonates to the emotions 
linguistically expressed by the patient. In a recent work attempting 
to integrate cognitive behavioral theories, embodied simulations, 
and psychoanalysis for the treatment of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, Peri et al. (2015) emphasized the importance of having 
a therapist present in face-to-face contact.
To sum up, embodied simulation does undoubtedly have 
crucial implications for classical psychoanalytic approaches: Gallese 
et  al. (2007) even suggested possible neural underpinnings of 
different psychoanalytic concepts, as the ones of unconscious 
communication, projective identification, empathic understanding, 
and therapeutic process. However, the idea that the present 
work intends to propose is that the psychoanalytic psychodrama, 
compared to the most classical psychodynamic approaches, allows 
to better emphasize the common ground between embodied 
cognition and psychoanalysis, by means of the spontaneous 
re-enactment of the bodily self in the effective intersubjective 
interaction with the auxiliary egos. The dramatization facilitates 
the shifting of the focus on somatic sensations through the 
first-person experience to be  touched, intimately related to the 
interpersonal dimension (Gallese, 2003, 2005; Keysers et  al., 
2004; Blakemore et  al., 2005; Ebisch et al., 2016). For instance, 
the possibility to re-experience our own tactile sensations, and 
to experience the ones of the other (through the role reversal), 
allows to reflect upon bodily conveyed messages that we  are 
not always aware of. Furthermore, re-enacting a scene in a 
safe-controlled environment allows to suspend acting for pauses 
and soliloquies. Paced by the therapist, soliloquy allows the 
patient to be led to greater sensitivity to bodily interoceptive 
signals (Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017), to eventually analyze 
the responses to one’s own/other’s sensations (e.g., fight or flight, 
or freezing reactions), disentangling their spontaneous components 
from the socially learned ones. Crucial in this respect is the 
evidence of automatic embodiment in the observer’s motor 
system of the sensory qualities of others’ pain (Avenanti et  al., 
2005). Another peculiar aspect of the psychodramatic method 
is the way in which it deals with projection, i.e., the archaic 
and primitive defense mechanism that consists in moving feelings, 
characteristics, or parts of oneself onto other objects or people. 
The stage and the auxiliary egos provide a different physical 
and social context from the one to which the person is accustomed. 
Acting/re-acting in a novel environment is less constrained by 
previous associations: this fosters the occurence of spontaneous 
responses and re-emerging of deep (unconditioned) desires and 
motivations. Projection mechanisms are progressively unmasked. 
Finally, psychoanalytic psychodrama allows the subject to really 
experience, in a protected setting, how much her own slight 
changes in responding to the same requests can determine an 
effective change of the current situation. The chronical repetition 
of events often depends on acquired dysfunctional responses 
to social environment, as well as on erroneous attributions of 
desires, motivations, and intentions to others. The repetition 
compulsion is characterized by circumstances that seem to repeat 
themselves, over and over again, beyond subjective agency: the 
acting cure seems more effective than the talking cure in dealing 
with it. In the acting cure, the new adaptation emerges 
spontaneously, disanchoring the individual from her acquired 
and rationalized responses. The sensory-motor and affective 
experience on stage provides the patient with a tangible evidence 
on the potentiality of her action, that is on the efficacy and 
persistence of her agency.
Body-Oriented Therapies  
and Psychoanalytic Psychodrama
Before addressing the specificities of psychoanalytic psychodrama, 
along with its original techniques, it is worth examining other 
body-oriented therapies. Indeed, from a clinical point of view 
the idea that the body can record, recall, and fix what a 
disembodied mind represses and loses is not completely original. 
Other psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic methods call 
upon the body. Let us think to Gestalt therapy or to the 
various body-oriented psychotherapies. Psychoanalytic 
psychodrama is not “superior” to these other treatments, not 
even in contrast to them, although distinguishable by 
its specificities.
The concept of creative adaptation aligns the theoretical 
elaborations of Perls (1969) and Moreno (1946; Moreno and 
Moreno, 1969). Gestalt psychotherapy emphasizes the balance 
between adaptation and creativity, typical of spontaneous 
contact processes. Psychodrama underlines the different roles 
that constitute the individual, to make them less rigid, more 
suitable and effective in relation to the context, in order to 
progressively detach them from the influences of significant 
others. Therefore, both models share the final purpose of 
enhancing the possibilities of adaptation to the environment. 
This commonality of objectives derives from the fact that 
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both Moreno and Perls move from a relational anthropological 
perspective: the development of the individual depends on 
how she interacts with her living context. While Moreno 
believes that the self emerges from the roles and that the 
crystallization of them determines a loss of spontaneity and 
the inability of creative adaptations, for Perls the psychic 
functioning is determined by the type of relationship that 
the individual has with her internal and external environment. 
Consistently a Gestalt technique is the one of the “empty 
chair”: the client sits next to the therapist, in front of an 
empty chair. She can project on the chair a person of real 
life, an emotional aspect of the self, or even an imaginary 
character. Thus, she can talk to whom is not in front of 
her eyes, but present as a fantasy: an internal representation. 
Entering into the relationship (i.e., the actual experience of 
feeling) should transform the individual’s internal perception 
of traumatically distorted relationships, to lastly get in touch 
with her actual needs. As in the case of psychodrama, the 
therapeutic intervention does not aim to modify the external 
situation but rather to reshape its misrepresentation. If 
projecting emotions onto an empty chair is certainly effective, 
the actual interaction with another sentient self (in the 
psychodramatic form, the auxiliary ego), which in turn reacts 
spontaneously to our verbal and bodily messages, greatly 
improves the intensity and extent of the exploration, and 
the powerfulness of the experience (Yablonsky, 1976). Indeed, 
Gestalt therapy often uses elements similar to the ones of 
psychodrama (e.g., role reversal), but with a critical difference: 
in Gestalt clinical approaches, the roles are all played by 
the patient (or, in the role reversal, by the empty chair), 
not by other people. Since these roles are all conceived only 
as projections of the self, there is no need for someone else 
to actually be  there; but this choice refrains from exposing 
the individual to the unpredictability of the other. Finally, 
in Gestalt therapy, the group can only identify itself as an 
observer, never as a participant, while in psychodrama the 
members of the group experience a deep sense of involvement 
by interpreting auxiliary and double egos (Rapaggi, 2008).
Among the body-oriented psychotherapy, we  could also 
include other forms of therapies: bioenergetic analysis, revolving 
around the Reichian idea of “character armor” (muscular 
tensions reflecting repressed emotion: Reich, 1945; Lowen, 1975); 
psychosomatic practice, with its holistic approach to patient 
management, encompassing psychosocial factors (Fava et  al., 
2017); different kinds of group psychotherapy (e.g., Schermer, 
2010); massage therapy, gaining popularity as complementary 
to medical treatment (Moyer et  al., 2004); mindfulness, aimed 
at reducing cognitive vulnerability to stress and emotional distress 
(Bishop et al., 2004; Bedford, 2012); and new clinical approaches 
that integrate bodily and psychological aspects as, for instance, 
neo-functionalism (Ottoboni, 2013). While acknowledging the 
important clinical value and theoretical interest of these 
approaches, psychoanalytic psychodrama differs from all of them 
not only for its extreme flexibility but also for the following 
distinctive aspects: the individual on stage is permanently an 
active subject; on stage, the subject does have the opportunity 
of directly experiencing that the change is achieved through a 
shift in physical-psychological perspective; her own actions’ 
reshaping allows to break through immutable dynamics. Finally, 
on stage the physical-tangible symptom falls into the background, 
to be  then called back in the analysis of its symbolic meaning 
and its “usefulness” in legitimizing the suffering of the patient 
(Jung, 1938). It is worth noting that this relationally oriented 
approach not only fosters a full mind-body integration but 
allows the patient to resolve the past and to visit her future. 
Conceptualizing, planning for, and moving towards the future 
in a realistic manner can be critical for some suffering conditions 
as, for instance, post-traumatic stress disorders (Dayton, 2006).
Specificities of Psychoanalytic 
Psychodrama
After clarifying to what extent more traditional psychoanalytic 
theorizations already enable to grasp the connection between 
psychodynamic and embodied cognition, below I  summarize 
the specificities of the psychoanalytic psychodrama with respect 
to embodied cognition and classical talking cure:
– Somatization. Despite the contemporary general “de-somatization” 
of psychoanalytic models (Fonagy, 2008), psychoanalytic treatment 
should actually remain a path throughout the history of the 
subject’s life, back to early infancy (Bazan, 2018), i.e., a stage in 
which drives and instincts cannot be  represented/encoded/
conveyed/unveiled by language. The talking cure inevitably shifts 
the attention on symbolic, “meaning-based”, mentalistic components 
of the self (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017), leaving the body “in 
the waiting room of the therapist’s office” (Conger, 1994, p.  211). 
Even when keeping out the components of warmth and intimacy 
that characterize the relationships with caregivers (“attachment”; 
Bowlby, 1969), action methods prioritize the rooting and structuring 
of the self in embodied and enacted experiences. At a very basic 
level, when the protagonist has to place different auxiliary egos 
on stage, deciding the specific distance one’s from each other, 
she re-experiences physical proximity and brings her attention 
to the social messages conveyed by this distance. This experience 
should affect also the sense of body: body boundaries are not 
only flexibly modified by tool use (Tessari et  al., 2010), but they 
are also affected by social interacting, as suggested by the analysis 
of IAD and EDs.
– Embodied vs. narrative self. Embodied simulations occur when 
we  process language, when we  perceive a visual scene, and 
even when we  imagine doing or perceiving something, since 
both real action and mental motor imagery activate a common 
network of cortical and subcortical motor centers (for an 
analysis on embodied narratology, see Wojciehowski and Gallese, 
2011). Evidence has also shown that the simulation shaped 
during language processing reflects the real interrelations between 
our body and external referents, suggesting that the simulation 
triggered by language is quite precise (Ambrosini et  al., 2012). 
The analyst’s full listening can benefit from the resulting empathy. 
Nevertheless, if we  create our own experience through our 
actions, if what we experience is shaped by how we act (enactive 
view, Varela et  al., 1991; Noë, 2004), attention should be  first 
paid to the embodied self. By using specific action techniques, 
and/or restructuring the scene (in a more or less symbolized 
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way), within psychodrama the sentient subject gradually emerges. 
Unspoken/unspeakable feelings pop up on stage. Interestingly 
silence is also taken into account. In contrast to silences that 
indicate awkwardness or distraction, “connectional silence” 
points to reflective suspensions or to mixed and ambiguous 
emotions. While clinical research is exploring pauses within 
speaking turns (Bartels et  al., 2016; Durieux et  al., 2018; Hill 
et  al., 2018; Visser et  al., 2019), in the embodied view not 
enough attention has been paid to communicative silence, 
which can convey social intentions and requests.
– Rationalized words vs. spontaneous body. Evidence on embodied 
simulation triggered by observing others challenged the notion 
that interpersonal understanding consists solely of our explicitly 
attributing propositional attitudes to others. Indeed, embodied 
simulations create (within the observer) internal non-linguistic 
representations of the body states associated with actions, 
emotions, and sensations (embodied empathic inference, e.g., 
Avenanti et  al., 2005). Consistently when the psychoanalyst 
(as well as the auxiliary ego) observes the play, she maps the 
protagonist’s actions onto her own motor system and the 
protagonist’s emotions onto her own visceromotor and 
somatosensory systems (Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011).
However, in the psychodramatic scene, the observer is also 
a listener. Embodied proposals have suggested to conceive words 
also in their social and public aspects (i.e., instruments for 
action) and speaking as performing actions in coordination 
with someone else (Clark, 1996; Borghi et  al., 2013; Scorolli 
et  al., 2016; Borghi et  al., 2017). Interestingly, the instrument 
“word” can detach from the body. It happens because the sentient 
individual is not “a cognitive harmony”: homeostatic and social 
affects can conflict with our internalized moral standards and 
ideals. That is, the bodily self can conflict with the self emerging 
from reasonable prohibitions and rational aspirations (i.e., the 
Freudian superego), which are mainly instantiated by language. 
The phenomenological counterpart of the inner dynamic friction 
is the action/word conflict. The meaning conveyed by language 
can conflict with the one conveyed by action, as it dramatically 
emerges on stage (e.g., the verbally conveyed message “I do 
not trust you” while physically approaching the auxiliary ego, 
thus acting a proximity despite the distance expressed by the 
words). If language is a tool, probably it is also the best tool 
for intellectualization and rationalization (as to defense 
mechanisms, see Freud, 1936), i.e., a tool at the service of the 
reflective and narrative aspects of the self. When on stage (but 
not necessarily on the psychoanalytic couch), if forced to choose 
between two conflicting messages, we  choose the one conveyed 
by the “unrationalized–unrationalizable” bodily self.
– Role reversal. The protagonist becomes aware of her actual-
effective messages mainly through a powerful technique of 
psychodrama: role reversal (Yablonsky, 1976; Blatner and Blatner, 
1988; Holmes and Karp, 1990). That is, the auxiliary ego roles 
into the protagonist position, re-enacting her actions, and verbal 
messages. Symmetrically, the protagonist roles into the significant 
other position and enacts that role, experiencing possible 
inconsistencies between the mentalized messages and the bodily 
conveyed ones. Thus, the protagonist looks at herself not just 
as if in a mirror: the role reversal favors the unveiling of 
protagonist’s intrapersonal conflicts. Furthermore, this technique 
allows the protagonist to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the other, of her intimate affects together with her implicit 
social pressure (let us think about a student rolling into the 
teacher position). Embodied evidence has demonstrated the 
motor effects of changing physical, social, and linguistic 
perspective (Gianelli et  al., 2013): psychodrama shows also 
the affective effects of preventing the individual from being 
stuck in her own viewpoint (for a review on the interplay 
between spatial and social spheres, see Proulx et  al., 2016). 
This technique favors transcending the limitations of egocentricity 
and prevents the protagonist from being trapped in her own 
defenses. During the action on stage, also the observing audience 
gets a deeper understanding of the human dynamic interactions.
For the sake of brevity, I  will not address other techniques, 
such as mirroring (the protagonist looks at the scene re-enacted 
only by auxiliary egos, thus without participating in the scene, 
but observing herself from outside), soliloquy (the protagonist 
expresses her thoughts and feelings aloud), and symbolized 
role playing, in which the director chooses an object, or an 
auxiliary ego, to portray a specific emotion/symptom/addiction 
(e.g., an addition can be  portrayed by a tug-of-war with the 
auxiliary ego; see Rapaggi, 2008). Future events can be enacted 
too, still in a constrained environment: this further differentiates 
psychodrama from pure imaginative techniques, drawing it 
near to virtual reality methodologies (e.g., Parsons et al., 2017).
– Doubling. In the technique of doubling, a person from the 
audience goes into the scene, puts a hand on the shoulder of 
the protagonist, and expresses a message in her shoes. The double 
gives voice to the unspeakable emotions of the protagonist. (The 
auxiliary egos cannot double the protagonist as they are already 
enacting an affective role in the scene.) She can also perform 
what the protagonist is unable to do (e.g., expressing anger 
physically). By touching the protagonist’s shoulder, the double 
establishes physical proximity and contact, as an extension of the 
protagonist’s body-mind. The double ego attempts to make conscious 
unexpressed materials. Both her verbal and physical intervention 
are often disowned by the protagonist: this resistance is discussed 
in the interpretative final phase. In the “choral doubling” all the 
people from the audience, one by one, double the protagonist, 
prompting more than one view. The evoked feelings and/or creative 
solutions allow an emotional and cognitive restructuring of the scene.
The double, and the members of the group as well, must 
refrain from both judging behaviors and suggesting 
interpretations. When the scene is over, the audience can share 
evoked events/feelings. Only the psychoanalyst is entitled to 
suggest hypotheses on unconscious conflicts (for a recent 
discussion of interpretation in psychoanalysis, see Kernberg, 
2016). Remarkably, transference is better handled through the 
psychodramatic techniques. Symmetrically, the analysis of 
countertransference (i.e., the analyst’s affective reaction activated 
by the patient’s materials) takes advantages of the right emotional 
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distance allowed by the continuous distributed reallocation of 
engaging emotions. Still maintaining the necessary affective 
resonance, this setting outdistances the analyst from taking 
part in the patient’s internal conflicts and from influencing 
the patient with her own value systems (“technical neutrality”).
The points sketched above suggest that psychoanalytic 
psychodrama can reconcile embodied and psychoanalytic 
approaches through the spontaneous actual re-enactment of 
significant relationships. In this sense, this method represents 
a turning point with respect to traditional verbal psychoanalysis: 
by prioritizing early reciprocal interactions and emotional 
engagements, it allows to explore the original interpersonal 
constitution of the self, by actually conceiving the self as rooted 
in and structured by embodied and enacted experiences 
(Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). For instance, as far as IAD 
and EDs are concerned, this method immediately leads the 
attention to “the body that I  am”, thus on muscles tensions, 
somatic resistance (Lowen, 1969), homeostatic affects (drives) 
and emotional social affects (instincts) (Wright and Panksepp, 
2012; Solms, 2017a,b). The other on stage allows to re-experience 
recursive loops in a safe setting and through different perspectives, 
coming back into contact with authentic needs. A mask can 
still be  used (cf. photoshopped picture in IAD), but then it 
is removed. The only mirror on stage is the other (cf. EDs 
and AN), which gives back to the protagonist a complex image 
of her lived/living body. The gradual re-structuring of the scene 
allows an actual nutritive experience. Differently from the cyber 
space (cf. IAD), all the emotions are accepted and not censored 
(e.g., not only joy but also sadness). Finally, the word (rationality), 
abused in social networks, is downgraded: if it conflicts with 
the action, action is what the person trusts.
POSSIBLE INTEGRATION WITH 
ECOLOGICAL CONNECTIONIST MODELS 
AND ROBOTICS
The psychodramatic approach is not far from ecological 
connectionist approaches. These relatively new proposals conceive 
the neural network as a model of the nervous system of an 
organism living in a certain environment. This environment 
is both natural and social, as it contains other organisms with 
which the (artificial) organism interacts (Cangelosi et al., 2010). 
In these distributed models a psychological entity (e.g., a 
concept, a word, a perceived object or its property) is not 
represented by a single unit, as in localist models, but by a 
particular pattern of activation of a set of units, thus different 
entities can be represented by different patterns of activation 
of the same units. Psychotherapy can be conceived as a sensorial 
input to the neural network, which, unlike psychotropic drugs, 
acts in a specific way and does have different effects depending 
on the specific individual. The current weights of the network 
can be  conceived as the result of all past experiences and 
learning: the treatment should remove the root causes of the 
patient’s discomfort by modifying a specific set of weights. 
Resulting changes in “patient’s network” should be  slower but 
long lasting (Parisi, 1989). In the case of an action method, 
the input would be  not only verbal but also motoric, thus 
enhancing accumulation of experience.
Interestingly, simulations of a certain learning with neural 
networks allow to investigate the stages through which that 
learning is achieved, without the need to postulate the existence 
of rules (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986; Plunkett and 
Marchmann, 1991). In contrast to cognitive-behavioral view, 
the change (the new adaptive behavior) would not be subordinate 
to the discovery and the incorporation of rules. With regard 
to the ecological approach, further possible advantages can be 
identified in the adoption of an action-based group therapy: 
the organism is examined in conjunction with its natural and 
social environment. In a similar vein, recent work in robotics 
underlines the need for new robots to be equipped with 
mechanisms of neural and perceptual readiness (Cangelosi and 
Schlesinger, 2015) but also with “affects” mediating and regulating 
the sensorimotor behaviors (Zhong et  al., 2016). Testing these 
robots would allow a breakthrough on developmental models, 
providing crucial hints on the developmental stages of affective 
subjectivity, to finally scrutinize the interplay between the 
adaptive brain, the growing body, the responsive social context, 
and the physical environment (Belpaeme et  al., 2016).
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Traditionally far away from each other, in very last years the 
“poorly evidence-based” psychoanalysis and the “censored” 
cognitive neuroscience are making a common effort towards a 
possible dialogue. On the cognitive-neuroscientific side, embodied 
cognition seems inherently suitable to achieve this fruitful and 
effective dialogue as it lays its foundations on concepts intrinsically 
shared with psychoanalytic approaches.
Across the present work, these shared constructs are sketched 
in relation to recent contemporary disorders, IAD and EDs, 
to finally introduce a therapeutic method suitable to approach 
the acting-sentient bodily self in a dynamic-social and affective 
environment. Psychoanalytic psychodrama copes with the 
spontaneous re-enactment of an actual (socially and physically 
constrained) experience, actualized by means of auxiliary egos. 
Drives and instincts can be  re-experienced by the protagonist 
in a safe scenario. The psychotherapist is a “listener” and an 
“observer”, and also the director: she gradually restructures 
the play to trace it back to the early reciprocal interactions 
with significant others, as well as to motivations often in conflict 
with each other. Unspoken/unspeakable feelings pop up on 
stage. The strength of this method mainly rests on re-establishing 
the priority of the embodied social nature of the multifaceted 
self, eclipsed by the classical talking cure.
Psychoanalytic psychodrama is basically aimed for clinical 
treatment, but it can provide interesting hints on embodied 
neuro-cognitive exploration for the following reasons:
– It actualizes embodied theoretical proposals, particularly the 
ones addressing the bodily self, intersubjectivity, affective 
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quality of verbal and bodily communication, and egocentric/
allocentric spatial reference framing, to gradually approach 
the social-affective realm.
– Psychoanalytic psychodrama puts forward an in-depth 
investigation of certain concepts, typically neglected by 
neuroscience, as the ones of internalized moral standards and 
ideals (Freudian superego) and unconscious conflicts.
– Regarding language, this method puts the accent on social 
communication, thus on the non-referential aspects of verbal 
messages. Even more, it emphasizes the “defensive” use of language. 
This defensive use, aimed at re-establishing a cognitive balance 
thorough a non-authentic narrative self, is unmasked on stage.
– Through the recursive use of explicit processes of symbolization, 
psychoanalytic psychodrama handles psychosomatic symptoms 
by reframing them in a complex affective structure, where to 
recognize instincts’ sources, aims, and objects (Freud, 1915a).
– From a theoretical and methodological point of view, this 
technique provides insights into the activation of motor 
simulation in an ecological context. In recent years, interesting 
work has been conducted on social cognition. Pioneering 
research has shown that newborns come into the world wired 
to socially interact (Castiello et  al., 2010) and that is possible 
to quantify the specific contribution of direct gaze and kinematic 
information on subjective involvement during interactions (Betti 
et  al., 2018). Moreover, the problem of direct social perception 
has been reframed in terms of establishing a measurable 
relationship between movement features and perceived mental 
states (Becchio et  al., 2018). The study of different contexts 
has highlighted a large increase of self-other integration in 
divergent-thinking contexts over convergent-thinking ones 
(Colzato et  al., 2016). As far as motor resonance is concerned, 
a subject of discussion is whether, in some contexts, mirroring 
the observed action can be  disadvantageous, as when we  have 
to perform a joint action. Both physical and social cues affording 
non-identical complementary actions have been identified 
(Sartori et  al., 2012; Scorolli et  al., 2014, 2018; Sacheli et  al., 
2015; Vesper et  al., 2017), but little is yet known about actions 
and contexts affectively connoted (Bastiaansen et  al., 2009; 
Kuhbandner et  al., 2010; Costantini and Ferri, 2013; Lowe 
et  al., 2016; on group membership, see Iani et  al., 2011; on 
motivations for joint actions, see Godman, 2013). Through a 
specific re-framing or re-adaptation of psychodramatic method, 
these challenging issues seem feasible to be  tackled.
– The acted scene can lead to disentangle the bodily self and 
the social product of its development, making explicit 
the  individual’s navigation across the internal conflicts. The 
“social product” of the self-development is affected by the 
specific environment the individual has had to deal with. 
The environment may have been more or less responsive to 
her requests, more or less conflicting with her biological 
drives and her own personality traits (Scalabrini et al., 2018). 
The social role is specifically addressed by sociodrama (Moreno, 
1934; Rapaggi, 2008), but psychodrama also offers the 
opportunity to study its impact on the bodily self.
– So far embodied cognition has been mainly focused on 
investigating the role of sensorimotor system in activating existing 
repertoires of knowledge: not enough attention has been paid 
on how body-mind linkages do influence processes of knowledge 
generation. Some interesting attempts have been fostered by 
using embodying metaphors to give rise to novel ideas (Leung 
et  al., 2012), or by focusing on measures of creativity assessing 
both convergent and divergent thinking (Simonton, 2003; Cheng 
et  al., 2008; Kuo and Yeh, 2017). Data converge in suggesting 
that creativity implicating physical acts does activate processes 
involved in overcoming mental fixedness, facilitating the 
psychological process of creative problem solving. Psychoanalytic 
psychodrama does have lots of potentialities to explore these 
new perspectives, testing how embodied representations can 
enlarge existing repertoires of knowledge and/or trigger cognitive 
processes necessary for generating creative solutions.
To conclude, recent advances in brain connectivity research 
are providing evidence supporting the convergence of 
neuroscientific findings and psychoanalysis, emphasizing how 
this knowledge can impact the “Neuropsychoanalysis” (e.g., Salone 
et  al., 2016). Neuroscientific data often enhance our descriptive 
knowledge, without substantially improving our understanding 
of brain functions (Kotchoubey et  al., 2016): the atomistic 
reduction can be  overcome through a common effort of both 
these disciplines. There are excellent premises for a future 
productive exchange between embodied neuroscientific approaches 
and psychoanalytic ones: first of all, the common aim should 
be to integrate the affective and the cognitive aspects of conscious 
and unconscious mental processes. Mainstream cognitive 
neuroscience has classically coped with the issue of consciousness 
focusing on “exteroceptive” objectified forms of consciousness, 
especially visual consciousness (Solms, 2013, 2014). By considering 
human subjective experience as the result of higher order cortical 
processes, the “corticocognitive anthropocentrism” has prevented 
from considering that having a subjective experience does not 
necessarily correspond to the fact of being self-aware of such 
an experience (Alcaro et  al., 2017). Both embodied cognition 
and psychoanalysis recognize and aim to investigate the existence 
of subjective experiences without self-awareness.
The cognitive unconscious and the psychoanalytic unconscious 
still appear to differ. The psychoanalytic (dynamic) unconscious, 
i.e., a boiling cauldron of impulses and desires, presupposes 
forces (whose nature is linked to unconscious motivations) 
that determine the passage of mental contents from the conscious 
state to the unconscious one, and vice-versa. By cognitive 
unconscious, instead, it is generally (still) meant the part of 
mental functioning that is unconscious not because it has been 
suppressed, but because it has never been known, and therefore, 
it will never be  remembered (neither it would be  useful, or 
therapeutic, to know this part). In the case of the cognitive 
unconscious, the focus is not on “contents” and emotions, but 
instead on “processes”. We  could also claim that the cognitive 
unconscious is the part of us that we  can never remember, 
neither forget (Migone, 1995, 2001). Actually, some recent 
constructs are enlightening on this respect: the “phenomenal 
minimal self ” is defined by Northoff (2013) as the pre-reflexive 
form of subjectivity that presupposes an experience, defined 
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by certain (pre)conscious qualities, and the implicit sense of 
being part of such experience. This definition underlines the 
two necessary and sufficient features of the self: intentionality 
and conscious sensitivity (Searle, 1991; Alcaro et  al., 2017).
For this fruitful dialogue between psychoanalysis and 
neuroscience to be  possible, the theoretical issue to be  urgently 
solved is the agreement on conceptual frameworks through which 
neuroscientists, psychoanalysts, and philosophers could profitably 
understand each other. To avoid confusion within the current 
plethora of psychological constructs (i.e., “core-self,” Panksepp, 
1998; “proto-self,” Damasio, 1999; “total self,” Rizzuto, 2008, 
Gallese, 2009; “phenomenal minimal self,” Northoff, 2013; “minimal 
self,” Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017; “affective core-self,” Alcaro 
et al., 2017; “embodied inter-subjectivity,” Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 
2017; “minimal affective subjectivity,” Solms, 2017a), when defining 
them it could be valuable to systematically refer to the Freudian 
second topical of the psychic apparatus (id, ego, superego). By 
this effort, new shared constructs can come up: they may even 
challenge the founding psychoanalytic ones (e.g., Solms, 2013), 
however, it is crucial they are systemic concepts, entailing also 
the human-environment relation (Solms and Panksepp, 2012; 
Kotchoubey et  al., 2016; Solms, 2017a,b).
To deal with the challenge of a mutually productive interchange 
between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, we also need to carefully 
examine suitable methodologies and possible novel paradigms. 
Techniques based on hemodynamic responses, as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron-emission 
tomography (PET), have been critical to investigate the impact 
of emotions on cognitive processes. It has been showed that 
the amygdala does have a crucial role in the recollection of 
emotional and motivational memories (fMRI: Dolcos et al., 2005), 
and that emotional information enhances visual memory 
recognition (PET: Taylor et al., 1998). Electrophysiological studies 
(EEG), in spite of the electroencephalography poor spatial 
resolution, have also provided interesting evidence, such as 
showing the amygdala neurons’ theta activity (4–8  Hz) during 
the consolidation of emotional aroused memories (Paré et  al., 
2002). Nevertheless, the promising technique to be deeply exploited 
in future research is the functional near-infrared spectroscopy 
(fNIRS): it allows to investigate cortical responses in face-to-face 
naturalistic scenarios involving two adult co-actors (Costantini 
et al., 2013), or infants and their parents (Lloyd-Fox et al., 2015). 
The advantages of fNIRS encompass non-invasiveness and 
portability, making this methodology potentially suitable to the 
psychodramatic setting. Finally, it is noteworthy the current 
renewed interest for the autonomic nervous system activity: its 
investigation is feasible through measuring the heart rate variability 
(extracted from the electrocardiography), the galvanic skin 
response, and the skin temperature. All these physiological 
measures, widely used to scrutinize emotions, require fewer 
sensors (that are often portable), and produce fewer artifacts 
on  respect to EEG. Their use, still suitable to the enacted 
scene,  is  particularly promising to investigate the impact of 
interoception on motivation, emotions, social cognition, and 
self-awareness.
Beyond linguistic issues and inter-/intra-disciplinary 
methodological concerns, a framework encompassing embodied 
proposals and psychoanalytic theorizations should be  sketched 
in a developmental and evolutionary perspective, by integrating 
philosophical and neuropsychological constructs, and considering 
ecological connectionist advances. Future interdisciplinary 
research should embrace action methods, as psychoanalytic 
psychodrama, since they are suitable candidates to explore the 
embodiedness and the embeddedness of human beings.
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